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We propose a quantum key distribution scheme by using screening angles and analyzing detectors
which enable to notice the presence of Eve who eavesdrops the quantum channel, as the revised
protocol of the recent quantum key distribution [Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 040501 (2005)]. We discuss the
security of the proposed quantum key distribution against various attacks including impersonation
attack and Trojan Horse attack.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a,03.67.Dd,03.67.Hk
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is to find a way
which enable to share the secret information between dis-
tant parties by transmitting quantum states. The secu-
rity of QKD is guaranteed by the law of quantum physics,
while that of the classical key distribution or cryptogra-
phy is done by the computational cost of the underling
mathematical problems.
Bennet-Brassard (BB84)[1] proposed the first QKD
protocol which uses 4 quantum states and Ekert (E91) [2]
suggested basing the security of the two-qubit protocol
on Bell’s inequality [3]. On the other hand, Bostro¨m and
Felbinger’ [4] initiates a new type of QKD which gener-
ates the key in deterministic way by passing the qubit in
two-way. Lucamarini and Mancini’s protocol [5] is also
classified in this type QKD. The deterministic feature of
the two-way protocols enables to apply the direct encod-
ing but in some case it was considered as a vulnerable
point.
The situation in regard to the trend of QKD looks con-
tradictory in the sense that QKD should be implemented
with single photon or sufficiently weak pulse to guarantee
the security, even though the coding should be done with
strong pulse to send the signal to longer distance. In this
regard, Kye et al. [6] has proposed 3-way type QKD pro-
tocol which enables to send not-so-weak coherent pulses
by loading the encoding onto the qubit with perfect ran-
dom polarization. Since the first version of the protocol
is vulnerable against the impersonation attack when it is
implemented with single pulse, they have proposed the
protocol using two coherent pulses. Unfortunately, there
has been several attacks [7, 8, 9] and the revised pro-
tocols [9, 10, 11] are followed. Even though the revised
version of the protocol is secure in present, the fact that
two coherent pulses are used to encode qubit has been
considered as the attack point [7, 8, 10, 11].
In this paper, keeping the basic philosophy of QKD in
Ref. [6], we propose a new scheme which blocks up all
known attacks [7, 8] and the composite attack which is
composed of PNS and Trojan Horse attack. The pro-
posed QKD protocol is described as follows:
(P.1) Alice announces a set S(N) which has N number
of screening angles,
S(N) = {α1, · · ·αN}, (1)
where the screening angle αi is defined as αi =
ipi/2(N+1). Alice prepares the analyzing detectors
(AD) in her setup (see Fig. 1).
(P.2) Alice prepares a qubit with arbitrary angle θ.
|θ〉, (2)
She sends the qubit to Bob.
(P.3) Bob choose a random angle φ and a screening angle
αb. He acts U(φ + αb) on the received qubit. The
qubit becomes
|θ + φ+ αb〉, (3)
where Bob occasionally takes φ as an analyzing an-
gle φ∗ ∈ {0, pi/2} with the probability pa. Bob
sends the qubit to Alice.
(P.4) After receiving the qubit, Alice applies U(−θ +
(−1)kpi/4 + αa), where αa is a chosen screening
angle. The qubit becomes
|φ+ (−1)kpi/4 + αa + αb〉, (4)
The fraction (1−t) of the photons in the qubit clicks
the Alice’s AD D1 and D2. If Bob takes φ = φ
∗
and screening angles αa and αb are matched as
αa + αb = pi/2, (5)
then the qubit incoming to Alice’s detector is |φ∗+
(−1)kpi/4+ pi/2〉. Thus the outcome on the Alice’s
detector Oa and Alice’s encoded key k are related
by
Oa = k ⊕ (2φ
∗/pi)⊕ 1. (6)
The above equation shows Alice’s integrity condi-
tion in AD. The remaining fraction t of the photons
in qubit is sent to Bob.
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FIG. 1: Setup of the proposed QKD.
(P.5) Bob applies U(−φ) on the received qubit. The
qubit becomes |(−1)kpi/4 + αa + αb〉. Bob mea-
sures the received qubit in (+pi/4,−pi/4) basis and
get the outcome Ob. The Bob’s outcome is defi-
nitely correlated with the encoded key k only when
the screening angles are matched as Eq. (5) and
the key k and Bob’s outcome Ob are related by
Ob = k ⊕ 1. (7)
(P.6) After repeating M times from (P.2) to (P.5), Alice
and Bob disclose the series of screening angles αa
and αb and the sequence of analyzing angle with
φ∗ and the value of φ∗. Alice and Bob create the
key ka and kb only with the sequence satisfying Eq.
(5) and exchange the hash values h(ka) and h(kb)
of the created ka and kb [6]. If h(ka) = h(kb) and
Eq. (6) is verified for all analyzing angles φ∗, key
creation is finished else Alice and Bob start again
from (P.1).
In general, the probability of the event which is satis-
fied with Eq. (6) is N/N2 = 1/N thus the key creation
rate is proportional to 1/N in this QKD. For example,
the simplest implementation is plausible with N = 2. In
that case, S(2) = {pi/6, 2pi/6} and 50% of the transmit-
ted quits are satisfied with the matching condition Eq.
(5). So Alice and Bob can utilize 50% of transmitted
quits in creation of key. The screening angles and AD
play an important role to detect the presence of Eve. As
we shall see, the screening angle unable Eve to relay the
qubit without inducing the measurement error in Bob
and AD blocks up general Trojan Horse attack and more
sophisticated one combined with PNS.
Since Alice and Bob only utilize the qubit event
satisfying Eq. (6) in creation of the key, this QKD is
not deterministic protocol. That is neither Alice nor
Bob expect the created key and it is determined only
after the announcement of screening angles, which is the
original concept of BB84 [1]. This is different feature
compared with the original QKD in Ref. [6]. Here we
shall show that the proposed QKD with screening angle
and AD is secure against the known attacks [7, 8]
Security against Impersonation attack:
In regard to the impersonation attack, we shall consider
the case that Alice turns off AD by setting the transmis-
sion coefficient t = 1 for the demonstration of the role of
screening angles clearly.
(1) Single photon Implementation:
(A.1) After (P.2), Eve intercepts and stores the
pulse from Alice in set E1. Thus Eve has
E1 = {|θ〉}. Eve sends to Bob a pulse orig-
inally prepared by her with random angles θ′.
(A.2) After step (P.3), Eve intercepts both pulses
from Bob and stores them in set E2 after com-
pensating with the angles −θ′. Eve then has
E2 = {|φ+ αb〉}. Eve send E1 qubit to Alice.
(A.3) After step (P.4), Eve intercepts the returning
qubit |(−1)kpi/4 + αa〉. Eve need to guess
αa to measure the qubit without error. If
Eve’s guessing is correct, Eve can read Al-
ice’s encoding and Eve get the outcome of
the measurement Oe = k. Eve encode the
Oe into E2 qubit then the qubit becomes
E′
2
= {|φ + (−1)kpi/4 + αb〉}. Eve send the
qubit to Bob.
(A.4) After the step (P.5), the receive qubit becomes
E′′
2
= {|(−1)kpi/4 + αb〉} Thus the Bob mea-
surement includes the error induced by Eve’s
impersonation as follows:
IE(N) ∼
N∑
i=1
sin2(αi − pi/2),
which is the lowest bound of the error due to
Eve’s impersonation. Thus it should be no-
ticed in the key verification stage of (P.6). If
Eve’s guessing was not correct, Eve reads in-
correct encoding and the error is additionally
propagated into the E′
2
and Bob’s key. It also
should be noticed in the stage of (P.6).
(2) Pulse implementation:
In this case, Eve’s attack strategy is different from
that of the single photon implementation. Eve can
use beam splitter to separate the pulse into two
parts and Eve tries to analyze the pulse measuring
it on both bases (α1 + pi/4, α1 − pi/4) and (α2 +
pi/4, α2−pi/4). However in this experiment Eve can
not get the conclusive results because two bases are
not orthogonal with each other. Thus it eventually
induces the error in Bob’s key as a results of Eve’s
relay based on inconclusive result.
If Alice turns on the AD with t < 1, Eve’s imper-
sonation without knowing the φ should violate the
3Alice’s integrity condition Eq. (6). So Alice should
notice the presence of Eve more easily.
Security against photon number splitting (PNS)
attack:
Since Alice and Bob announce the screening angles in
(P.6), the security against PNS attack determined by
the two random angle θ and φ. Thus the security is
almost same with that of single pulse implementation of
QKD in Ref. [6]. The only difference is that the random
angle φ is partially known to Eve when Bob chooses the
analyzing angle φ = φ∗ .
Security against Trojan Horse type attack:
To eavesdrop the key, Eve needs to distinguish the her
injected photon from those in the pulse and separate it
out correctly. Thus Eve necessarily marks the injected
photon by using time delay or frequency shift [12]. How-
ever it is known that this type of marking can be blocked
with properly designed apparatuses and filters [12]. Ac-
cordingly, we assume that Alice has a properly designed
filter as in Fig. 1.
It is clear that the proposed QKD is robust against
simple Trojan Horse attack, because in (P.4) Alice’s en-
coding is performed with the random angle compensation
of θ such that U(−θ+ (−1)kpi/4+αa). Accordingly, the
information gain for Eve, who attacks quantum channel
with independent Trojan Horse state |η〉, is zero because
the separated qubit always has the random polarization.
Thus the general Trojan Horse attacks discussed in Ref.
[12] are not useful for Eve in our QKD.
However Eve can consider the following strategy which
combines PNS and Trojan Horse attack.
(B.1) After (P.2) Eve performs quantum quit measure-
ment on the pulse and if the number of photons
are larger than one, Eve separate out a photon and
keeps it in E1 = {|θ〉}.
(B.2) Eve attaches the photon |θ〉 onto the incoming pulse
after (P.3). The state of incoming photon pulse is
given by |θ+φ+αb〉⊗|θ〉. After (P.4) the outgoing
pulse is given by
|(−1)kpi/4 + φ+ αa + αb〉 ⊗ |(−1)
kpi/4 + αa〉. (8)
(B.3) Eve keeps E2 = {|(−1)
kpi/4 + αa〉} after separat-
ing the photon from the pulse. Eve reads the key
value k by measuring E2 after the announce of αa
in (P.6).
With this strategy, if Eve separates out the |(−1)kpi/4+
αa〉, she can eavesdrop the k after the announcing of αa
in (P.6) by measuring the separted qubit [15].
We can see that this strategy of Eve is easily noticed
by the help of AD. The fraction (1− t) of photons in the
qubit in Eq. (8) clicks on Alice’s AD. The mixed state
|(−1)kpi/4 + φ + αa + αb〉 ⊗ |(−1)
kpi/4 + αa〉 eventually
give rise to the violation of integrity condition in Eq. (6)
[14], because the equation holds only when the pure state
|(−1)kpi/4 + φ+ αa + αb〉 is entered.
Eve may consider the attack proposed in Ref. [13]
which attaches the standard state |0〉 instead of PNS pho-
ton |θ〉 in (B.2) and calculates the polarization directly
estimating maximal mean fidelity. The corresponding
qubit is
|(−1)kpi/4+ φ+αa +αb〉 ⊗ | − θ+ (−1)
kpi/4+αa〉. (9)
This qubit also violate the Alice’s integrity condition in
AD (Eq. (6)) [14].
By announcing the larger number of screening angles
N , Alice and Bob may get rid of possibility of the leakage
of the information encoded on the qubit. To attack the
protocol which uses the larger number of screening angle
N , Eve need to prepare N separated pulse by using the
beam splitter and to measure the pulses with N differ-
ent nonorthogonal basis. Accordingly, the probability of
which Eve get the conclusive result for relay is suppressed
depending on N thus we can say that the security level
of this scheme is proportional to N , while the key cre-
ation rate is proportional to 1/N . We note the Bob’s
choice of the analyzing angle φ∗ does not affect the key
creation rate because φ∗ is also one of the random angle
that Bob can choose in (P.3). Alice and Bob establish
the desired security level by controlling the number of
screening angles N , appropriately. It can be summarized
as follows:
Key Creation Rate ∼ 1/N, (10)
Security Level ∼ N. (11)
In conclusion, we have proposed the revised QKD pro-
tocol which enables to implement QKD with not-so-weak
single pulse. We have shown that the screening angles
and AD enable Alice and Bob not only to notice the im-
personation attack but also to block up the Trojan Horse
attack and the composite attack with PNS. The proposed
QKD is simple to implement and provides tunable secu-
rity level depending N .
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